تشكيلة الفريقين

تشكيلة الفريقين

عمر عبدالرحمن ، مهاجم وهمي :

في السنوات الماضية رأينا عودة “المهاجم الوهمي” و المثال الأبرز لهذا المركز هو المبدع ليونيل ميسي تحت قيادة بيب غوارديولا، و في الآونة الاخيرة زلاتكو طبق نفس الفكرة مع صانع الالعاب عمر عبدالرحمن .. دوره بالضبط التحرك الى الخلف لسحب مدافعين الاهلي من خط الدفاع و خلق مساحات لكايو و اسبريلا

وسط الاهلي ، متحرك هجومياً و منضبط دفاعياً:

التحركات المستمرة عن طريق الحمادي، ريبيرو، حبيب الفردان و وليد  حسين اربكت دفاعات العين خلال الشوط الاول لكن عندما خسر الاهلي الكرة أرجعوا اللاعبين الى البلوك الدفاعي بسرعة لايقاف خطورة العين

هذا كان السبب الرئيسي لعدم تألق اسبريلا و كايو في الشوط الأول، لأن الخيارات كانت مغلقة و العين لم يملك صانع العاب في ظل غياب عامر عبدالرحمن بالاضافة الى وجود عمر عبدالرحمن (صانع ألعاب العين الاساسي) في خط الهجوم. الارتكاز ماجد حسن تواجد في وسط كل شيء لتنظيم منظومة الاهلي لمراقبة مهاجمين العين و عدم اعطائهم الحرية للتحرك.

الاهلي يسيطر على مجريات الشوط الاول:

بلا شك، الاهلي كان افضل بالكرة في الشوط الاول حيث استخدم ماجد حسن قدراته في التحكم على الكرة و التمركز في مناطق جيدة لفتح مساحات خلف خط وسط العين. سقوط اللاعب الى خط الدفاع لمساعدة المدافعين على بناء الهجمات من الخلف مهم لأنه يعطي الاهلي قوة في الدفاع وايضاً يجذب لاعبي العين مما يوسع المسافة بين هجوم و وسط العين.

عندما نجح ماجد حسن في فتح المساحات عادت الكرة الى ماجد ناصر لكن الاخير لم يكن جيدا في استلام الكرة و لذلك كانت تمريرته سيئة و استرجع العين الكرة بسهولة، لكن نظرياً هذه الطريقة كانت الانسب لاختراق خطوط العين. السبب يعود الى  محاولات الاهلي لعزل احمد برمان عن بقية خط الوسط، و تطبيق التفوق العددي عليه عبر الحمادي، الفردان و ريبيرو.

العين يلجأ الى المرتدات و يستغل المساحات خلف دفاع الاهلي:

فعلاً، العين استفاد من وجود عموري كمهاجم وهمي لانه اجبر مدافعي الاهلي على متابعته في الملعب. هذا ادى الى تحرير كايو على الجهة اليسرى ليهدد مرمى الاهلي اكثر من مرتين في اخر ثلث ساعة من المباراة، و سجل في الوقت بدل عن الضائع ليسرق العين النقاط من يد غريمه الاهلي.

اللقطة الاولى: ثلاثة لاعبين يراقبون عمر بينما يجري كايو الى المساحة الخالية ..

اللقطة الثانية: عمر عبدالرحمن يلفت انتباه مدافعي الاهلي، و ناصر الشمراني يجري الى المساحة الخالية ..

تشكيلة الفريقين

تشكيلة الفريقين كانت كما تنبأنا لكن وظائف اللاعبين تغيرت عن العادة و ذلك بسبب اهداف المدربين التي حصلت لتخفيف الضرر من فريق الخصم. المشكلة لفريق الاهلي أتت من أمر غير تكتيكي، و الامر كان الضغط الشديد على الفريق في ملعبهم و امام جمهورهم الكبير في ذات المباراة. على سبيل المثال، هذه المباراة كانت الاولى في 13 مباراة التي شهدت عدم تسجيل القناص ليما اسمه على قائمة الهدافين في المباريات. لكن وصول ليما الى دبي في الصيف للعب مع نادي الاهلي كان عنده آثار تقتصر الاهداف فقط، و هذه الاثار تشمل الضغط الفعال و التواصل بين المهاجمين الذي كان غائبا منذ رحيل غرافيتي و مونوز. هذا الاداء كان الأسوأ للبرازيلي، الذي لم يكن على احسن حالاته و ايضا احمد خليل الذي غاب عن المباراة على الرغم من لعبه ل90 دقيقة.

علاوة على ذلك، مهاجمي فريق جوانجزو لم يكونوا على اقصى جهدهم لكن النادي الصيني كان الاقرب الى هز الشباك، و هذه الفرص و هذا اللعب أتى من فلسفة “كمية الفرص افضل من جودة الفرص”. أظهرة الاهلي القلقة كانت تحت الضغط العالي من جناحي و مهاجمي جوانجزو. لولا المحور المحلي الموثوق ماجد حسن الذي كان يتمركز من بين مدافعي الاهلي لخلق تشكيلة 5 في الدفاع في بعض الاحيان، الاهلي كان سوف يعاني من هدف.

بناء اللعب – جوانجزو

علم مدافعي جوانجزو خطورة مهاجمي الاهلي مع و من دون الكرة: ليما، احمد خليل، اسماعيل الحمادي و ايفرتون. لتخفيف الضغط على مدافع جوانجزو فينغ، أرشد سكولاري المدافع بتعليمه بالتحركات الخاصة بالنسبة لمهاجمي الاهلي. تحرك فينغ بسقوط مركزه على الملعب و ابتعاده من المهاجمين الى العمق – ذلك لتعويض ايقاف المدافع الكوري كيم يونغ غوون – لاستقبال الكرة من الحارس تشينغ.

آثار هذه التحركات كانت احتمال زيادة مهاجمي الاهلي الى عمق جوانجزو و منطقتهم لسرق الكرة من المدافع لكن الفريق الصيني كان واثقاً في هذه الاستراتيجية لبناء اللعب قبل اطلاق الكرة الى الوسط. بالاضافة، فريق سكولاري كان عنده مرونة الاختيارات في بناء اللعب.

لاعب تشارلتون الانجليزي و سيلتيك الاسكتلندي السابق و قائد جوانجزو حاليا، زينغ زي، نسق اللعب بتمريراته المتقنة و تمركزه الواع. سقط مركزه على الملعب و دخل الى خط الدفاع لتعويض تحرك الظهير الايسر لي كجناح في منطقة عالية على الملعب. الظهير اليسر تقدم لكن الظهير الايمن بقى في مكانه و مع زلك تمركز زي من بين الظهير الايمن و القلب الدفاع الايسر للحفاظ على خط دفاع سليم. هذه الاستراتيجية تسمى الغير متماثل او asymmetrical في اللغة الانجليزية. عادة الظهيرين يتقدمان و الاجنحة يدخلوا الى العمق لكن فريق جوانجزو فضل اللعب و التمركز الغير متماثل.

أسلوب هجوم الاهلي

لعب الاهلي جاء من لاعبين فقط: ماجد حسن و اسماعيل الحمادي. عادة الفرسان الاحمر يجدوا انفسهم مع التنوع الى الطرق للابداع، مثلا: ريبيرو، عبدالعزيز صنقور و حبيب الفردان. لكن هؤلاء اللاعبين لم يكونوا على اقصى جهدهم في هذه المباراة. صانع الالعاب البرازيلي ريبيرو كان منعزل، و هذه نتيجة توجيهات كوزمين التي رأت اللاعب على الجناح الايمن. هذا المركز غريب على ريبيرو الذي يجيد اللعب في العمق او في انصاف المساحات.

اشتغل ماجد حسن بوظيفته كالعادة: تسليم الكرة من خارج الخط الدفاعي او دخوله الى الخط الدفاعي من دون الكرة لمساندة زملائه في الحالات الدفاعية. على العكس تماما، اسماعيل الحمادي اشتغل بدور مختلف بالاضافة الى بدايته في المباراة كجناح ايسر. من الجهة اليسرى سقط مركزه الى “نصف المساحة” اليسرى لمساعدة زميله ماجد حسن في بناء اللعب مع غياب اداء حبيب الفردان في خط الوسط.

من هذه النقطة، أظهر الحمادي مهارته العالية مع تحركات مميزة التي سيطرت على مجريات اللعب. مع كل الطاقة التي تجدها مع باولينهو و الهدوء على الكرة من زينغ زي، هذان اللاعبان كانوا غير فعالين في تأمين خط الوسط. مدافعي جوانجزو هما الذان يستحقان المدح.

حيث أن التمريرة الحاسمة عند الحمادي كانت تفتقر الدقة، عندما كان يدمج لعبه مع ليما، صنقور و ريبيرو، الاخير كان يفضل المراوغة و ليس التمريرة! هذه الحركة أغضبت كوزمين الذي اراد الفرص ان تهدد شباك جوانجزو على الاقل.

العرضيات و البحث عن الهدف

المباراة كانت مرتكزة بصورة عامة على موضوع العرضيات، خاصة العرضيات المنخفضة. هذه الفلسفة ليست فعالة و احصائيات تسمى “ExPG” تؤكد فكرة العرضيات الكثيرة. لكن، العرضيات المنخفضة عادة مدروسة و ليست عشوائية. الفريقين أسسا كرتهم الاخيرة على العرضيات المنخفصة. الهدف كان لهذه الانواع من العرضيات ان تستقبل المهاجمين المندفعين. على الرغم من احسن محاولاتهم، ليما و خليل (الاهلي) و غولارت و الكيسون (جوانجزو) أخفقوا في تأثير مجريات المباراة. خاب أمل سكولاري على اداء اللاعبين البرازيليين، و في وقت مبكر من الشوط الثاني استبدل المدرب البرازيلي بمواطنه ريكاردو غولارت و دخّل الجناح يو هانشاو. صحيح ان اداء غولارت كان مخيب للأمل خاصة بعد الاهداف الثمانية التي سجلها على مدار المسابقة،  لكن دوره التكتيكي كان مناسب الا ان اداءه الطبيعي لم يكن جيد لمباراة نهائية. مهاجمي جوانجزو فرغا منطقة 14 و التي تسمى “Zone 14” في اللغة الانجليزية، و هذه المنطقة مركز صانع الالعاب.

مع هذه الفلسفة عند المدربين الاثنان، لماذا لم يدفع المدرب الروماني بعبدالعزيز صنقور الذي يجيد في اللعب كظهير ايمن (لكنه كان متواجد كظهير ايسر) على الرغم من وجود وليد عباس على دكة البدلاء و هو ظهير ايسر(و يمكنه ان يلعب كقلب دفاع) يلعب مع رجله اليسرى؟

خلاصة

أخطأ اولاريو باشراك اللاعب عبدالعزيز هيكل على الجهة اليمنى و البطاقة الحمراء هي توصية لاخفاق اختيار المدرب في مباراة نهائية. اشراك هيكل زادت الضرر و الثغرات في نظام الاهلي و ليست فقط البطاقة الحمراء التي أدت الى اداءه السيء.

من ناحية اخرى، فريق جوانجزو لم يكن موثوق بسيطرته على الاهلي في الهجوم، لكن الدفاع الصيني برع بغياب المدافع الكوري كيم.

The problem for Al-Ahli was that a non-tactical factor, which was the large amount of pressure on them, significantly affected the way they played. For instance, Lima failed to score for the first time in 13 games. Lima hasn’t just brought goals to Al-Ahli but better connection between forwards and efficient pressing to the front line. This performance failed to bring out the best of his forwards and the likes of himself and Ahmed Khalil were non-existent.

Moreover, the Guangzhou forwards were not on top of their game but were closer to hitting the net than Al-Ahli did, in terms of quantity and not quality of chances. The apprehensive Al-Ahli full backs were often under swaths of pressure and relied on slide tackles from defensive midfielder Majed Hassan, who dropped into the defensive line quite often.

Guangzhou build-up play

It was clear that Guangzhou knew the wrath that comes with the Al-Ahli strikers, with and without the ball. To relieve pressure off of their centre backs – especially in the absence of South Korean Kim Young-Gwon – Guangzhou had one of them drop much deeper to receive the ball from goalkeeper Cheng.

This way, the CB is able to release the ball with time on his hand.

The implications of this were the fact that Al-Ahli’s strikers could overload Feng Xioting on the ball, but Guangzhou were fairly confident of receiving the ball under minimal pressure before releasing the ball into midfield behind the strikers. However Luiz Felipe Scolari’s team were versatile and able to vary their forms of getting the ball out of the defence.

Former Charlton Athletic midfielder and veteran Zheng Zhi orchestrated the play from deep the rest of the time. He dropped directly into defence, the right channel to be more specific. This was then met with an asymmetrical form of attack. Guangzhou’s back 4 stayed intact with the exception of Zhi being another centre back while left back Li overlapped and linked up with his teammates on his respective flank.

Al-Ahli attack mode

Al-Ahli’s play came through a couple of players: Majed Hassan and Ismaeel Al-Hammadi. Usually, the Red Knights find themselves with a variety of options that come in the form of Abdulaziz Sanqour, Everton Ribeiro and Habib Fardan. Those three were non-existent and Ribeiro was disappointing on such a big occasion, yet that could largely be put down to his position on the right wing.

Majed Hassan operated as normal, receiving the ball as he strays just ahead of the defensive line or dropping into the defensive line to aid his centre backs. Ismaeel Al-Hammadi had a completely different role, in addition to his placement on the left wing. From the left side he dropped into the middle third left half space, helping isolated Majed Hassan in the build-up play.

From that point, Al-Hammadi would show off his dribbling skills and silky movement to get past the Guangzhou midfield. For all the drive Paulinho offered on the ball, and serenity provided by Zhi on the ball, both weren’t powerful enough to dominate the midfield battle. Guangzhou’s defenders deserve the biggest plaudits, without a shadow of a doubt.

Whereas Al-Hammadi’s final pass was lacking, whenever he combined with other players such as Lima and Sanqour, Ribeiro (on the end of the attack) preferred to maze his way around the Chinese defence instead of looking for a pass or shooting into the open space. This angered Cosmin who wanted to see more shots to test the opposition ‘keeper. 

Low crosses and looking for goal

The game was largely based around this theme – crosses. This doesn’t sound very efficient, with ExPG rates confirming the phenomena about crosses. However, low crosses are usually calculated as they don’t look to aim randomly towards the goal in hope for a deflection into the net.

Both teams based their final product on low crosses. The aim was for these types of crossing to meet their onrushing strikers via their full backs, Sanqour (Al-Ahli) and Li (Guangzhou). Despite their best efforts, Lima & Khalil (Al-Ahli) and Goulart & Elkeson (Guangzhou) failed to affect the game or the end product of their respective teams. It came to a point where Yu Hanchao entered in place of the Ricardo Goulart. Despite his exit early in the second half, Goulart made nippy runs in behind Al-Ahli’s full backs to help the wingers out in attack. Guangzhou vacated Zone 14 and forced the Al-Ahli defenders deeper to allow more space for Paulinho to drive in and distance the strikers away from the defenders.

The pathway to being in place for these crosses was through combination play. Guangzhou attempted this down the left side via their left back or their right-winger on the opposite side. Al-Ahli on the other hand forced their play down the half spaces, more so the left where Al-Hammadi operated in. One would wonder had Sanqour played down the right side (his original position) and Walid Abbas down the left side, Al-Ahli would have: not received the red card on Haikal, have an overlapping right back (a very creative one in Sanqour) and allow Ribeiro to occupy central positions where he works best at. 

Conclusion

Cosmin Olaroiu made a mistake in playing Abdulaziz Haikal and not due to his red card but due to the consequences of making connections within the system. He added energy to the team but that wasn’t what was needed.

On the other hand, Guangzhou weren’t entirely confident of their dominance against Al-Ahli. Their defence was fantastic in the absence of Kim, but their attack wasn’t as sharp on this occasion.

اما في الهلال، فقد قام دونيس  بتغييرات كثيرة و مفاجئة. بعد ايقاف المدافع البرازيلي ديقاو و ايضا سلمان الفرج، خسر الهلال خياراته المهمة. اولا، التشكيلة التي تشمل قلوب الدفاع الثلاث بقيادة الكوري الجنوبي كواك، كانت لا بد ان تلغى خاصة في مباراة لها اهمية كبيرة. نعم، في بعض الاحيان نظام الفريق يتكون من ركائز الفريق و لا يجوز ان يتم تغييره في وقت متأخر بعد الانجاز الهلالي معه – مثلا الفوز على النصر بعد هدف المدافع المشهور “جحفلي” في كأس الملك و ايضا البداية القوية في الدوري عبداللطيف جميل.

و في الساعات قبل المباراة كان على بال المشجع الهلالي السؤال التالي: “من؟”

و أصر المدرب اليوناني دونيس، المعروف بقدراته التكتيكية، على المدافع احمد شراحيلي في دفاع يتكون من 3 مدافعين خلف الارتكاز المخضرم سعود كريري. و للأسف اظن ان أمرا كبيراً حصل بين الحارس خالد شراحيلي و دونيس نفسه، لأن مجرد التأخير عن التمارين ليس سبباً منطقياً لابعاد الحارس الاول و الحارس المتألق مؤخرا من مباراة تحسم الفريق الصاعد الى المباراة النهائية. ربما، الحل الأحسن هو العقاب بعد المباراة و في مجريات الدوري المحلي.

و اعترف دونيس نوعا ما بغلطه بعد 37 دقيقة حينما استبدل اللاعب احمد شراحيلي بالمايسترو و الخلوق محمد الشلهوب. أخرج قلب دفاع، و أدخل لاعب من طراز عالي و لاعب يساعد الفريق في الامور التكتيكية و التمركزية. لكن دعنا نرى ماذا حصل في اول نصف ساعة من المباراة و كيف – مرة أخرى – صعد السيد كوزمين اولاريو الى قمة تفكيره و اكتسح الفريق الملقب بالموج الأزرق.

البداية – “صعبة قوية”

طريقة تشكيلة نظام الهلال التكيكي، صعب جدا تنفيذها على أرضية الملعب، خاصة في الحالات الدفاعية. السبب يأتي من المدافعين الثلاث الذين يحاولون توسيع الملعب الى انصاف المساحات و الاطراف، لاستغلال اكبر ضعف في الفرق (مثلا الاهلي مع عبدالعزيز هيكل، و قد نذكر المباراة الدولية بين منتخبي الامارات و السعودية من اسبوعين) و قوة كبيرة عندهم. يحاولوا لفت انتباه اللاعبين الذين يتواجدوا في انصاف المساحات او في قلب الملعب، و مع ذلك الظهير الهلالي يسعى لادخال الكرة الى اهم محطة في ملعب كرة القدم و هو منطقة الوسط.

half space = انصاف المساحات // المصدر: spielverlagerung.com

مقال عن انصاف المساحات / المسافات

و مع توسيع المدافعين الى الاطراف بشكل مفتوح، تجد الثغرات المحتملة مع التخطيط الداهي. ركز و استغل هذه الثغرات خورخي دا سيلفا(مدرب النصر السعودي) في الموسم الماضي خلال “ديربي الرياض” و بعدها توج بلقب دوري عبداللطيف جميل. تجد المساحات من بين المدافعين الثلاث، لكن الامر ليس سهلا بنظرة للماضي. ديقاو و جحفلي مدافعين سريعَيِن يغطيان بطء المدافع المتوسط المتعقل، كواك.

و اذا كان النصر السعودي، مع كل احترامي لهم، مع خورخي دا سيلفا و فابيان استويانوف هزم الهلال في هذا الشكل فلا بد من  أن يستغل الاهلي الاماراتي مع القيصر كوزمين و السفاح ليما هذه الثغرات الواضحة. ايضا، ديقاو – سريع، قوي و احسن مدافعي الشرق الاوسط – موقوف. فهل من الممكن ان يعوض احمد شراحيلي فقدان ديقاو؟

1:56 -> 2:02

كما نرى في اللقطة الماضية، عاقب المهاجم احمد خليل المدافع احمد شراحيلي بحركاته الى المناطق من بين المدافعين و الذي يسمى channels باللغة الانجليزية، او كما تسمى “المسارات”. احمد خليل عزز هدف ليما مع تمركزه العبقري في المسار الخارجي (منطقة الجناح) و هذه المشاكل الدفاعية الهلالية نتيجة لتمركز الظهيرين العالي كجناحين. و هذه تنبع من عدم وجود جناحين في تشكيلة الهلال 3-6-1.

0:37 -> 0:46

الهدف الاهلاوي الثاني شهِدَ تمريرات قصيرة و ذكية (الأسلوب الذي يؤيده بيب غوارديولا) التي دمرت نظام الهلال بشكل مميز. محمد جحفلي الذي يتواجد كقلب دفاع ايمن، وجد نفسه في منطقة الارتكاز و اعلى من مركز كريري! هذه من صفات اللاعبين الذين يتواجدون في صفوف الفرسان الحمر.

اسماعيل الحمادي و احمد خليل من اهم لاعبين الاهلي منذ اعوام. تمركزهم من دون الكرة يساعد فلسفة الاهلي في الهجوم و يوسعوا الملعب للفت انتباه المدافعين الى الاطراف و ذلك لاعطاء المساحة الشاسعة للمايسترو ايفيرتون ريبيرو و عادةً حبيب الفردان الذي ينشغل في عدد من الوظائف في الملعب، و هو من ابرز لاعبي الاهلي لكنه لم يتلقى الثناء المستحق. الجدير بالذكر هو ان حبيب الفردان كلاعب فردي يختلف عند ملازمة ماجد حسن في الملعب، لأنها يشكلان تفاهما عاليا مع بعضهما البعض. الفردان و ماجد حسن مثال للقول الانجليزي: The whole is greater than the sum of parts. اي “ان الجميع اكبر من مجموع الاجزاء”.

ضغط هلالي و العودة من الهاوية

على الرغم من الهدف الثاني الذي سُجِلَ بعد تغييرات دونيس في الشوط الاول، و شهد الشوط الثاني عودة المشاغب المتألق ناصر الشمراني ليعوض تأخر الهلال في الشوط الاول. الهلال كان في تشكيلة متعددة الجوانب و زيادة في التحركات و الطاقة. ناصر الشمراني أخذ مركزه على الجهة اليمنى كمهاجم متأخر ليستغل فرصة و امكانية ازعاج مدافعين الخصم، خاصة الظهيرين.

و كتشكيلة عامة لعب الهلال ب 4-2-3-1 عالي و مفتوح، مع تبادل الشلهوب و العابد في منطقة صانع الالعاب و تمركز كريري من خلف اللاعبين قليلا. الجناحين ادواردو و الشمراني تواجدوا في منطقة عالية و بجانب أظهرة الاهلي، مع الoverlap من أظهرة الهلال ليشكلوا overload (زيادة لاعبين الهلال على الاهلي في منطقة معينة) على فريق الخصم.

رأينا هذه الحالة، تحديدا حالة السقوط للأهلي، في مباراة نفط طهران. بعد هدف اياب في ملعب ازادي سجله ليما، تقدم الاهلي عبر ليما مرة ثانية لكن في مباراة الذهاب التي لعبت في استاد راشد امام حضور جماهيري كبير. و المباراة سارت بخير و الاهلي كان متقدماً في كل الجوانب بعد نهاية الشوط الاول. و بعد ان الحكم احتسب ركلة جزاء لصالح الاهلي في الدقيقة 50، الأمور كانت مريحة نظرياً. الأمر الغريب هو كيف الاهلي في الدقائق ما بين ال55 و ال75 يغيب عن المباراة!

امام الهلال رأينا هذه المشكلة بقوة بشكل مغاير مباراة نفط طهران، سجل الهلال هدفين على الاهلي في هذه المرحلة و ليس هدف فقط مثل فريق نفط طهران الذي لم يكمل مهمته تحت قيادة علي رضا منصوريان. عدم التركيز و ارتياح العقل في هذه الفترة ضار لمعنويات الفريق التي سوف تهدم بعدم العقلية المناسبة لمباراة آسيوية. لكن، هذه كانت أول وجود لأغلب اللاعبين المحليين في صفوف الاهلي. و المدح في هذه الفقرة يتجه الى المدرب كوزمين الذي طور الاهلي بدنيا و تكتيكيا على الرغم من الصعوبات النفسية التي تؤد الى مأزق تحت اداراة فاشلة… لكن في هذه الحالة، سعادة عبدالله النابودة رئيس الاهلي و السيد كوزمين اولاريو قدموا اداء مفيد للفريق في الكواليس.

عودة للهلال، الاداء السوبر لم يستمر طويلا وبعد حوالي 20 دقيقة خسر السيطرة على المباراة لكن بهدفين احسن من ال 55 دقيقة التي سبقت سيطرة الازرق. و لكن مع مرور الوقت، تمكن ممثل الامارات باعادة السيطرة الى ملعبهم و ليس فقط الاستحواذ على الكرة بل خلق الفرص المناسبة للقناص ليما… و لكنi أهدر فرصتين ثمينيتين بشكل مفاجئ! زادت امكانية اختراق الاهلي للمساحات و في العمق بعد دخول جناح ليفربول الانجليزي السابق أسامة السعيدي.

خرج احمد خليل (المهاجم الصريح) للسعيدي و بهذا التغيير فتح كوزمين الاحتمال للمرونة من الاختيارات للفريق في نظامه الهجومي. السعيدي من طراز ال”جناح الداخلي” و الذي يدخل الى الوسط للتواصل مع زملائه و يحصل على امكانية التسديد على المرمى. لكن في هذه المباراة أخفق في تحويل الفرص الى تسديدات على المرمى و التى هددت عرين السديري.

و هذه الاحداث شاهدت اهداء كبيرة للثنائي ماجد حسن و حبيب الفردان الذين كانوا من الأسباب الرئيسية في ارجاع السيطرة الى ملعبهم. و بعد ذلك حصل المستحيل و فاز الاهلي في امر غير تكتيكي و الذي شهد حشد في منظقة الهلال لأي فرصة للتسديد للمرمى و حقق كوون ذلك و أمن بطاقة التأهل لفرسان الامارات.

خلاصة

أظهر كوزمين عن مرونة كبيرة في أفكاره و كيف ييف ممكن ان يترجمهم الى نظام مميز في الملعب. لكن التنازل في الجانب النفسي في الشوط الثاني سوف تكون ضار امام فريق كبير و ذكي في جوانجزو الذي عنده الامكانية ان يستغل من الهفوات الاهلاوية. نتمنى التوفيق لممثل الامارات. 

Lebanon’s Montenegrin manager Miodrag Radulovic reacts during their 2018 World Cup qualifying group G football match against Kuwait in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon on June 11, 2015. AFP PHOTO / STR

Lebanon are steadily rising under Radulovic and haven’t looked as tactically smart since Theo Bucker’s two year stint. What was missing from this side to help them challenge for the top spots? A better finisher up front coupled up with possibly more movement from Moni to free Maatouk, the star of the Lebanese National Team.

Instead of dissecting Lebanon’s tactical features in detail, I will look at what they have excelled at (tactically) under Radulovic. For all the character that Bucker had, Radulovic compensates for that with his tactical intelligence.

Individual issues 

Lebanon have only conceded 4 goals in the World Cup Qualifiers, and when you look at the goals they don’t come from tactical problems rather individual problems. Let’s address them here first.

Goalkeeping Dilemma – Abbas Hassan has been a controversial pick for Lebanon. Despite Lebanon’s success under Bucker, he was always the weak link. Therefore, Radulovic came under scrutiny after picking Hassan after his consistent blunders. Mahdi Khalil is currently the best goalkeeper in Lebanon at Safa SC yet the sole fact that Abbas Hassan plays for Elfsborg in Sweden (where he has played 3 games in the space of 2 years) saw him ‘earn’ a first team spot.

Mahdi Khalil

Abbas Hassan

Mahdi Khalil entered the fray against Myanmar and Kuwait after Hassan’s disastrous run of form, and Lebanon successfully nullified any defensive frailties via Khalil’s commanding performances in goal. “What if?” Lebanese fans ask. “What if Khalil played against Kuwait in the first game, and helped us at least hold them to a 0-0 draw? We’d have much more of a chance to qualify.”

Abbas Hassan’s passiveness has proved a big problem for Lebanon. In 3 of the goals he conceded (1 has been as a result of a penalty) we can see how he either a) stares at the ball going in, without any attempt at moving or b) making a late dive to save the ball, which he ultimately fails in. The arrival of Khalil has strengthened the Lebanese defence massively.

Khalil’s confidence, command of area and communication has become the epitome of Lebanese goalkeeping since the retirements of Ziad Al-Samad and Larry Mehanna.

A look at Lebanon’s latest starting XI.

Individual defensive ability – Legendary centre back Youssef ‘Dodo’ Mohammad has been away from club football for more than 1 and a half years and is still going strong. You can’t blame him for the little, if any, mistakes he makes. Yet his commanding performance has been lauded in the media and rightly so.

The only significant problem – which is now offset by Lebanon’s medium to low defensive block – is his partner. Although Joan Oumari and Bilal Najjarine aare good players, they struggled to fit in. The reason for this derives from their tendency to draw themselves towards the attacker Dodo is taking care of. However that could be linked to Lebanon’s attacking intentions towards the end of the game against Kuwait (away from home). Moreover, South Korea possess players in the English Premier League such as Ki, and were no doubt many levels above the in-transition Lebanon.

Finishing Dilemma – 75% of the goals Lebanon have scored in the World Cup Qualifiers have occurred due to Hassan Maatouk’s involvement. The only goal scored without his touches or movement was Abbas Atwi’s goal against a relatively weak Myanmar (who shipped 9 goals against Kuwait) in injury time.

Despite the addition of tricky and former Al-Ittihad Jeddah winger Mohammad Haidar, Lebanon have failed to put the ball in the net more than four times in five games; a travesty in itself.

Mohammad Ghaddar and Moni haven’t played club football in more than 6 months (the latter for much longer), Philippe Paoli is still a part of the U-23 team and former Sporting KC forward Soony Saad – sadly – has missed out a large portion of playing time due to injury.

Defensive structure

Block and set-up

Radulovic has indoctrinated a 4-5-1 medium-low defensive block system that ensures the protection of the most important part of the pitch: the centre. With Lebanon boasting two powerful 1-on-1 full backs in Ali Hamam and Walid Ismail (defensively), both of whom are able to recycle possession well, Radulovic needn’t to worry about the flanks as opposed to the heart of the pitch.

This match saw two ‘strikers’ up front for Lebanon. Abbas Atwi and Roda Antar played as False 10’s to block the SK defensive midfielders from receiving the ball. Tactical flexibility.

Defensive midfielders  

The Lebanese strength in the centre comes from the defensive midfielders. Another variation that Radulovic has used was adding a centre back into defensive midfield to win aerial battles and add a body in midfield to support Haitham Faour. Joan Oumari (FSV Frankfurt) and Nour Mansour (Safa SC) have been tried in defensive midfield, and both have performed well.

These have not only added ‘aerial’ winners, but in Mansour and Oumari you have different players. Oumari was played alongside the calmer Haitham Faour against SK, to bring an aggressive style of play to the proceedings. On the other hand, Mansour dropped behind Antar against Kuwait in the absence of Faour to cover the space around him and block any chances stemming from the talented Saif Al-Hashan.

Mansour (circled) in between a triangle of Kuwaiti players, positions himself well – to defend, not receive the ball – in case of any turnovers.

Pressing

Lebanon are extremely passive in the press, with their high-pressure deliberately a form of delay rather than win the ball back.

In this image we can see how Lebanon position themselves far away from Kuwait’s defenders to organise themselves.

However, it was clear that Radulovic highlighted Fahad Al-Ansari of Kuwait. He stands at 1.95m tall, with long legs helping him to intercept the ball easily. Plus, he is adept at playing the ball out of defence.

To battle this, Radulovic blocked the centre under all circumstances. Knowing that the full backs are adept at 1-on-1 situations defensively, he was assured of security in deeper areas.

This picture shows all of the tactical ideas put into place. Al-Ansari is not being heavily pressed, but “delayed” until Lebanon tire Kuwait into winning the ball. We see Nour Mansour near Al-Hashan in the middle although not man-marking him, while Oumari’s aggressive tendency sees him move out of the defensive line and screaming instructions.

One of the best Arabian football players, Bader Al-Mutawa (#17) drops all the way back to defensive midfield to help Kuwait! Note, Al-Mutawa is a “False 10” (attacking midfielder who acts as a striker) and instead he had to drop deeper.

Attacking structure

The key problem for Lebanon across the course of the qualifiers has been their attacking profligacy. Besides scoring 4 in respective 2-2 draws against Iraq and Syria, they have only seen 4 goals scored (combined) against Palestine, Jordan, South Korea, Kuwait, Myanmar and Laos.

Kuwait alone against Myanmar scored more goals in the second half against Myanmar than Lebanon did in the whole qualifying process. A more worrying stat comes in the form of 2015 itself, where Kuwait scored more goals (9) against Myanmar than Lebanon did in the whole of 2015 (8).

Let’s look at how Lebanon’s structure has adapted under Radulovic. One very key tactical aspect used by Pep Guardiola and Thomas Tuchel is overloading one side of the field. They do this to free up space on the “underloaded side on the pitch”. This is where they let Arjen Robben or Henrikh Mkhitaryan attack space with much more space around them. In this case, the “Arjen Robben” is the dazzling Hassan Maatouk who plays for Fujairah SC in the United Arab Emirates.

The Lebanese players have adapted to each other and the system very well – considering they did not play together for more than a year, before the arrival of Radulovic – and it can see Walid Ismail (LB) or Mohammad Haidar (RW) do the same and be found in space to receive the ball and counter attack into space.

Walid Ismail – #18 – in acres of space on the left flank.

The reason that Lebanon failed to execute this could go down to the fact that this was the first time it was implemented to its optimum potential (relative to Lebanon and Middle Eastern football level) and still had the final parts of finishing (which is a psychological and talent-centric aspect of football) which didn’t work. Hassan Maatouk is not Ronaldo, and even Ronaldo isn’t a factor for his team every single game.

Conclusion 

Calls for Radulovic to depart have started to lessen. Many people are still optimistic for a final push with Radulovic for the final round of qualifiers but know that it may be inevitable should the nation not qualify.

In an era where tactics and statistics triumph over sole talent, Radulovic is using his time well to scout and plan for the Lebanese national team. After all, he travelled around Europe all summer looking for players of Lebanese origin.

It’s time for Lebanon to understand that there is a way out without talented players and that is strategic triumph on the pitch. With that, current players will develop under the reign of the current manager.

Minor things have become – ironically – a huge part of football tactics (I wrote about this in-depth in this article for Outside of the Boot). Therefore what Cosmin Olaroiu looked at made the biggest effect on the game, seeing Al-Ahli come away with a vital away goal despite a draw. Al-Ain – a bigger and better club than Al-Ahli (winning the league title that year) – succumbed to a 3-0 loss to Al-Hilal in the same stadium, which is why Al-Ahli’s draw is considered a win in this context.

I spoke about Saud Kariri and Salman Al-Faraj in the preview of the match, looking at how they compare with each other in the roles they play. With the former being 35 years old, it was surprising to see him rooted to the bench with his experience and ability a vital cog in the Al-Hilal system that saw them awkwardly play their way out of defence. 

I called it: Al-Hilal would suffer from Al-Faraj’s inferiority in the half back role (Lekhwiya touched upon it in the quarter finals but failed to capitalise on the match due to their defensive mishap). A better team in Al-Ahli did so, making Al-Hilal pay for their mistakes and grabbing a vital goal at one of the hardest stadiums in Asia. This is the 15th consecutive game that Al-Hilal haven’t been defeated in at home in the Asian Champions League.

Al-Ahli set-up

Olaroiu placed the ‘formation’ as a 4-4-2 with two narrow wingers in Ismaeel Al-Hammadi and Everton Ribeiro. His double pivot of local duo Majed Hassan and Habib Fardan was mesmerising once again, both of whom now can showcase their ability on the continental stage.

The space Al-Faraj would operate in was near the strikers of Al-Ahli, positioning himself in between them to receive the ball when possible. This however played into the Red Knights’ hands as efficient pressers Rodrigo Lima and Ahmed Khalil terrorised him wherever he went.

Mission: Nullify Salman Al-Faraj

Al-Faraj had a couple of options left while under pressure, yet these passes could be considered unviable due to them landing backwards, out of the pitch or in areas where they could not affect the centre (or even, the flanks where their superb wing-backs are located).

All of these 3 images show how Al-Faraj is being either 1) pressed 2) watched or 3) surrounded.

As versatile as Al-Faraj is he is no Kariri. Kariri is similar to the Busquets of Al-Hilal, with Al-Faraj slightly ahead in an energetic and skillful Iniesta-esque role. Putting that into context, Iniesta would struggle in a role such as Busquets’ that values ultimate perception, movement and body positioning to ensure the safety and smoothness of the build-up.

Saud Kariri immune to pressure from an image in the game against Al-Nassr Riyadh.

Lima would harass the nimble Al-Faraj, who would have preferred to use his capabilities in breaking Al-Ahli’s lines via dribbling, and if he ever escaped the menace of Lima, Khalil awaited. Weaker selections from Donis aside, Olaroiu prevailed in a massive encounter. Al-Hilal lacked a ball playing midfielder to break the lines, as they played with two runners in Kaabi and Al-Faraj. Should Kariri have started, Al-Hilal would have had the ability to start with Al-Faraj to break Al-Ahli’s lines subsequently bringing on one of the most intelligent Arab footballers to ever come across Asian football: Mohammad Al-Shalhoub.

Al-Shalhoub is a tactical weapon despite his age, bringing in creativity and understanding to the table. Once again, Donis placed his belief on the young lads which was detrimental to the team’s overall performance.

This forced Carlos Eduardo (usually stationed high up in attacking midfield or alongside the striker) to return all the way to the halfway line to inject speed into the build up. Eduardo essentially was a box to box midfielder himself in this game, making runs forward before returning all the way to the defensive line to aid his teammates.

Eduardo (circled in red, above) was forced to return. This was the first occurrence, where he only had one Al-Ahli player ahead of him! He is being tasked to help the double pivot of Kaabi and Al-Faraj of which has been severely weakened by Al-Ahli’s calculated pressing.

Double pivot worthy of international recognition

Al-Ahli’s best work came from the central midfielders Habib Fardan and Majed Hassan. The latter can be compared to Nabil Bentaleb in his role. A good passer and not easy to push off, but his body positioning in certain situations needs to improve in terms of executing the right pass forwards. At the age of 23, he can certainly build on these qualities to propel him towards replacing Amer Abdulrahman and Khamis Esmail in the UAE line-up, in their bid to qualify for the 2018 World Cup.

Habib Fardan is underrated himself albeit being the most expensive Emirati footballer after his move to Al-Ahli last year. An energetic, technical and no-nonsense midfielder poses the Emirati as a nuisance to opposition midfielders. Whether Olaroiu asks for a composed performance or a broadly attacking one, Fardan is one of the first members under his command and ready for duty.

Here they work with the wide midfielders to halt build-up. Al-Faraj circled in black (left one) and being watched constantly.

Look at how Al-Ahli’s narrow 4-4-2 forced Al-Hilal out of dangerous areas.

These two nullified Al-Hilal’s attacking midfielders and saw Al-Dossary move out to the wing (placing himself in line with the wing backs, which is inefficient and opposed to positional play that is supported in the modern day) to make runs towards there. Ailton was very limited too despite his set-piece goal.

Conclusion

Minor changes led to major results. Al-Ahli now return to Dubai with an away goal, and a 0-0 draw is enough to see them qualify for their first ever final. How will Donis prepare for the second leg? It seems that his decisions have been costing Al-Hilal in recent weeks despite being on great form. Does this indicate that Al-Ahli are a better team? Possibly.

Al-Hilal have had their problems (against Al-Raed, Lekhwiya and Al-Wehda; these differed from an excess of crossing, lack of pivot support and no ball players in midfield plus the massive gap behind the wing backs and in between the centre backs) yet none have been able to capitalise on the fascinating attack of The Blue Wave. On October the 20th, we will see the next of the superb series of matches in West Asia.

Now although Al-Ain’s pair of matches against Al-Hilal in the same round last season, they failed to come away with a respectable result at the King Fahd Stadium (possibly due to the managerial differences between Cosmin Olaroiu and Zlatko Dalic) and thus didn’t have the momentum to overturn a 3-goal deficit. Al-Ahli however, as we have previously mentioned, are sky rocketing with momentum. With their last 90-minute loss coming in a mid-table nothing clash against Baniyas in the Arabian Gulf League (2014-15), things are looking up for The Knights of the United Arab Emirates. 

A fan on Arabic TV Show Sada Al-Malaeb shouted: “SALMAN IS NOT A DEFENSIVE MIDFIELDER! SALMAN IS NOT! DONIS NEEDS TO MAKE SURE OF HIS CHANGES!”

Al-Hilal, a mammoth club and currently the 2nd best ranked in Asia tore apart Qatari Champions Lekhwiya, who were now under former Qatar National Team manager Djamel Belmadi after the departure of Michael Laudrup.

Al-Hilal vs. Lekhwiya | 4-1

Asian Champions League Quarter Final – First Leg

| Al-Hilal Goals: Ailton, Kaabi, Eduardo x2 |

| Lekhwiya Goals: Msakni |

Hilal: Blue | Lekhwiya: Red

As you can see, the systems varied. On one hand, you had an unorthodox 3-6-1 seen prominently by Liverpool in the second half of the 2014-15 Premier Leagues season, and on the other hand you had another unorthodox system as Lekwhiya’s front 3 formed a very fluid 4-4-2 Diamond / 4-3-3 shape. An amateur move from Belmadi it proved to be.

The flanks become area of battle

With centre backs of high quality and experience, a solid base in midfield and a plethora of skill and movement in attack; Al-Hilal are a versatile team currently on red-hot form. It was the case of using their flanks, and with up-and-coming Al-Braik at right wing back looking to make his mark on Asian football coupled with a return of Yasser Al-Shahrani to the left side, things were looking bright for the “Blue Wave”.

Intelligent movements from the wing backs saw Al-Hilal dominate throughout 2015, as they position themselves away from the central build up to stretch the play and widen the gaps in Lekhwiya’s defence. With next to no defensive help from Youssef Msakni and Mohammad Muntari, Lekhwiya were bound to suffer.

Look at Al-Braik positioned wide on the right, hugging the touchline that opens up Lekhwiya’s defence. This leaves space from Carlos Eduardo to run into, as Ailton occupies both centre backs. Movement from Kaabi and Al-Dossary keep the central trio of the Qatari side busy, helping Al-Hilal to domination in all aspects.

The half space is wide open, that it allows the onrushing Kaabi to receive the ball in the box. Notice how the left centre back of Lekwhiya doesn’t move out to press as he is busy blocking  the chance to Ailton Almeida who’s movement is becoming a clear route for goals.

In the build-up to Al-Hilal’s third goal of the game, movement from the attacking midfielder towards the left halfspace sees a 2-on-1 created leading to a low cross from Yasser Al-Shahrani for Carlos Eduardo – formerly of Porto – to tap in. The question here is how the unfit Lekhwiya players could deal with the buzzing Al-Hilal players, who exploited their poor spacing towards the middle and end of the game.

Once again, look at the movement of Ailton into space behind Lekhwiya. No doubt it would have been different with the fitter players however the decision making of Belmadi proved wrong and Giorgios Donis, one of Asia’s rising tacticians, fully exploited it as he most usually does.

Exploitation of build-up

I previously talked about the passiveness of Msakni and Muntari, as opposed to the top notch workrate of Nam Tae-Hee. “Nam was always a workhorse”, says Qatari football expert Ahmed Hashim (@AhmedH_93).

Moving on, we have to talk about the miss of experienced captain Saud Kariri, now 35 years of age. He missed out on the Saudi Super Cup in London and the beginning of the ALJ League due to family reasons and it’s clear that Al-Hilal’s main weakness over the last month has been solely from the midfield support.

Al-Hilal’s centre backs are all capable of playing out of the back and relying on themselves as a trio to push forward, however the space covering, position supporting and ever reliable defensive midfielder was missing in today’s game. Kaabi is the player who replaced Kariri, however the former is based on drive, flair and movement as opposed to circulation, defensive awareness and reliability.

Kariri with the ball, surrounded by 4 players, yet immune to pressure.

Here, Kariri supports the defence despite the heavy pressure. Under no circumstance does he succumb to the hoarding of players.

Al-Faraj hounded by Lekhwiya players.

Al-Faraj who is actually known for his versatility failed to make himself comfortable in Kariri’s usual role, the half back of sorts. Al-Faraj was easily suspect to pressure, which is understandable as his role is usually to provide flair in the deeper zones of the pitch that are located in the opposition half.

Therefore, Lekwhiya’s only goal came – predictably – from a hoard of pressing. It worked, as Al-Hilal leave the spaces between their centre backs deliberately open and wide to push up and force movement into the opposition half. Msakni and Nam combined to score the opener:

But here is where the irony came, as Lekwhiya did the same process once again, forcing Kwak to pass into a congested zone through their smartly executed pressing trap. Unfortunately, Luiz Mairton missed a 1-on-1 chance and Al-Hilal subsequently scored seconds later!

Notice that Lekhwiya’s successful pressing actions resulted in either 3 or more players on 1 man or a body from midfield joining the press.

Ineffective Muntari and rookie decisions from Belmadi

Studying Al-Hilal well, you see that they go direct once they see their wing backs in space and look to form any sense of threat towards the opposition through that area of the pitch too. To battle this, Belmadi played with a narrow 4-3-3 / 4-1-2-1-2 that was fronted by the lack of defensive acuity from Muntari and Msakni.

Instead of using a 4-4-1-1 for example, that could have seen the fluid combination play from talented Msakni and brilliant Nam up top backed up by Boudiaf and Luiz with actual wingers supporting their full backs to overload Al-Hilal, a weird decision was made by the former QNT manager. He’s now stuck in a quandary, how to use the team to overturn a 4-1 defeat to a team only weaker than Guangzhou Evergrande.

The decision looks even worse when you see that Mohammad Tresor is a weak link for Lekhwiya, and proved that in the game that now all but confirms Al-Hilal’s participation in the Asian Champions League semi-final. Maybe there was an in-game alteration that Belmadi looked to implement? Unfortunately, lumping the ball to Muntari – who is ineffective in aerial duels – worked to no avail.

Wrap-up

A very interesting tactical battle, and Al-Hilal are the team to watch. Should Al-Ahli (of Dubai) and Al-Hilal progress to the semi-finals, we may see a brilliant tactical battle between two of the brightest tacticians in Middle Eastern and Asian football (the other manager being Cosmin Olaroiu).

Al-Hilal are not limited to these tactical wildcards either, as Mohammad Al-Shalhoub is another master at reading the game. Al-Hilal – as I previously said – are a must watch at the current time.

Line-ups and dynamics of both teams.
Al-Nassr (yellow) and Al-Hilal (blue).
White = Nassr movements.
Black = Hilal movements.

This match up was extremely important coming into Week 25 for a couple of reasons. First of all, this was the Riyadh Derby with one week to go in the league. Al-Nassr, leading Al-Ahli by two points, needed a win to further themselves from their Jeddah rivals as Al-Ahli go up against their own in Al-Ittihad on the final game day of the league season.

And the game ended with Al-Hilal down to eight (!) men after a hard tackle from Mohammed Jahfali, a last man tackle from captain Saud Kariri and a fight from Salem Al-Dossary. Chaos ensued at the King Fahd Stadium, but that was not enough to stop Al-Hilal giving Al-Nassr a run for their money in this game.

Abdullah Al-Enezi was nothing short of mesmeric with his shot stopping for Al-Nassr key to them winning the league. Al-Ahli Jeddah lose out on the title with a draw against Al-Taawon as they now finish second – four points behind the second consecutive league winners.

Speaking of league winners, Al-Ahli have not won the league since 1984, having provided us with an astounding season that couple up with the best striker in the region (Omar Al-Somah) while finishing undefeated should they avoid defeat next week in the Jeddah Derby against Al-Ittihad. Definitely reminiscent of Liverpool in 2013-14; a team with one of the best strikers around (Luis Suarez), losing it from their own mistakes and not winning the league in quite a long time (1989).

Nevertheless, Mohammad Al-Sahlawi showed up in the big game once again, but let’s talk about how Jorge da Silva and Giorgios Donis aimed for this to play out: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2pq6a4 (the goal)

The Al-Nassr fans. (nassr.com)

 Al-Hilal shape and system

Al-Hilal’s shape resembled the reincarnated Liverpool at the turn of the year, when they employed a 3-4-2-1 formation with a box midfield and two “Trequartistas”. Thiago Neves and Salem Al-Dossary were apart of the attacking double pivot, supporting Nasser Al-Shamrani up front. Abdullah Al-Zori was a menace down the left flank, but this enabled other things to happen in defence (a domino effect). Unfortunately, Faisal Darwish was unable to affect play down the right flank and neither was he efficient defensively.

After the first red card, they continued with a 4-2-2-1 on the Football Manager version of “Overload”, and as they went down to 9 men it was chaos all over the pitch.

And off he goes. (nassr.com)

Al-Nassr shape and system

Al-Nassr went into this game with another “reincarnation of Liverpool” formation, with the 4-4-2 Diamond their numerical formation coming into this game. Attacking midfielder Adrian was everywhere today; pressing high, backwards pressing, dropping deep, creating, moving to the flanks, creating overloads. It was only right that he got the assist to the (offside) goal that won Al-Nassr the game.

 Al-Hilal calm, composed and convincing…

The game was all in favour The Blue Wave at the beginning of the game. Their back three enabled them to build out with ease from their defensive third with occasional help from the goalkeeper. Salman Al-Faraj, Thiago Neves, Abdullah Al-Zori and Salem Al-Dossary were all on the top of their game in the first 45 minutes and were the main threats of the Al-Hilal team.

Although, that wasn’t translated into clear cut chances with Al-Nassr doing so well to block Thiago Neves and Salem Al-Dossary out of the game in the first quarter of an hour or so. The opposition’s diamond midfield was often turned into a rhombus with Adrian’s non-static positioning providing the much needed-dynamism for the Al-Nassr team.

And with more than 65% of possession for Al-Hilal in the first twenty minutes it seemed like we would be treated to a game of “possession vs. counter attack” but as soon as Al-Nassr perfected their counter attack: taking advantage of the large spaces in between Al-Hilal’s lopsided back three / back four, easily seeing that Kwak although composed on the ball it was “a shame he is composed off of it” (by @korfan on Twitter) and his lack of physical dominance at the age of 33 saw him drawn out to create a large space behind him where Al-Nassr formed a 3v1 overload and allowed Mohammed Al-Sahlawi to score.

Al-Sahlawi celebrates. (nassr.com)

 Al-Nassr reveal the touch of the champions

Al-Nassr were stuck in their own half at the start of the game as Adrian did all of the work towards forcing the play and creating chances for the team, also doing most of the pressing work as he did so moving in between both strikers who drifted into the half spaces. That all changed after the goal, which saw Al-Nassr take initiative and dictate the tempo of the game (not with possession of the ball as much as their off the ball movement showed, though).

Al-Sahlawi’s astute usage of his head to bully Kwak and Jahfali in the air was one of the Al-Nassr game plans, but the main plan was to obliterate the back 3 who were not adequately protected by the double pivot of Salman Al-Faraj and Saud Kariri. Saud Kariri was forced into areas of clear under load and in the end it became so dangerous that Kariri was the last man on the pitch, and sacrificed himself in turn for the Al-Hilal to avoid conceding a goal.

Salman Al-Faraj added flair into the game using his nimble dribbling and nifty skills to get past players but it wasn’t enough against the midfield diamond of Al-Nassr. Al-Nassr counter attacked with pace, isolated the back three (who were wide open in the half spaces) to provide clear-cut chances.

The statistics showed that Al-Nassr only created four attempts on goal (two on target) while passing the ball only 33 times in the opposition final third. This proved the danger that their attack and midfield can do in ‘bits and bobs’, with Jorge Da Silva outsmarting his Greek opponent Donis.

Final Word

We congratulate Al-Nassr on winning the league for the second time in a row, and albeit scoring an offside goal and escaping a clear penalty call, it is more Al-Ahli’s fault for dropping points against Al-Taawon as Al-Nassr were superb across the whole season, winning their 20^th game of the season (out of 25 games played as of yet) yesterday

The Asian Champions League exit may have hurt, but they will be back next season.

Al-Ain shape and line-up

Al-Ain started without star striker Asamoah Gyan who was still recovering from an injury that he picked up a couple of games ago, but he was named as a substitute looking to bring in energy and intelligence during the late stages of the game. Kembo-Ekoko and Diaky Ibrahim took turns operating as a false 9. Helal Saeed returned to the lineup pairing up with Lee MJ in defensive midfield and the versatile partnership of Ismail Ahmed and Mohanad Salem was present for Al-Ain.

Al-Ain in a lopsided high pressing 4-1-4-1 that can drop into a 4-2-3-1.

Al-Ahli shape and line-up

Al-Ahli went with a surprising lineup choice of their own after Olaroiu kept record signing Everton Ribeiro out of the starting XI, keeping him as a wildcard option once the game reaches its climax (actually coming on in the dying seconds of the game). Kwon Kyung-Won returned to defensive midfield after a spell in defence and Jimenez was paired up top with the underwhelming yet energetic Ahmad Khalil.

Minimising and controlling space key to opening half hour

The opening 30 minutes was more of a cautious affair between arguably the two biggest clubs in the UAE. Al-Ahli’s shape resembled a 4-4-2 with an alternating structure depending on the movements of the former Inter Milan player Luis Jimenez. The adjustment paid its dividends since, defensively, Al-Ahli were much more secure than usual. Olaroiu used his expertise to adapt once again to the situation that his team were embroiled in and successfully nullified the opposition for the first half with only one chance against them of note.

Al-Ahli sitting back in a 4-4-2.

The basis of Jimenez’s movements depended on the phases of play that Al-Ain were adjusting to, with the first and second phase of Al-Ain’s play being halted as a result of Jimenez and Khalil’s projected and vociferous pressing. Al-Ain had to play through the flanks as Khalil and Jimenez were coordinated in their harrying, unless Helal Saeed dropped in between the centre backs to aid in playing the ball out of the defence. If and once Al-Ain surpassed the oncoming press Jimenez slotted back into the #10 position to balance Al-Ahli and shift them towards a 4-4-1-1 or 4-5-1 had he dropped deeper than normal.

Al-Ain on the other hand, played with a higher defensive line than Al-Ahli, subsequently taking initiative and controlling most of the game’s possession. Al-Ain’s lineup possessed players efficient and creative in possession of the ball: Lee MJ, Helal Saeed, Omar Abdulrahman, Mohammed Abdulrahman and Diaky Ibrahim. These players helped them in taking control of the game and dictating a tempo; cautious, calm tempo.

Helal Saeed dropping to aid the defence against the compact Red Knights.

This was forced upon them as without the pace of Asamoah Gyan and Miroslav Stoch, Jires Kembo-Ekoko was the only outlet that could drive against Al-Ahli with pace (with a possibility of the same from Diaky Ibrahim) and that was minimal due to their occupations as a rotating false 9 in this game.

Al-Ain shape up situationally according to Al-Ahli’s phases in possession

Al-Ain took another form of nullifying Al-Ahli’s creativity albeit playing with a very high defensive line at times, but this worked to some extent except when Ahmad Khalil exploited it a couple of times – failing to impact the scoreline, of course.

During Al-Ahli’s first phase of possession Al-Ain would press in small groups formed from their front 6 in the 4-2-3-1 or a lopsided 4-4-2. Mostly, the groups would consist of a trio that would prove to be successful due to the triangular possibilities offered from the 4-2-3-1, where the striker, central attacking midfielder and winger could press as a triumvirate with the central midfielder supporting from behind.

Blue Box: 3v2 overload – Green Circles/Red arrow: Direct pressing option – Black arrows: Cover shadow

Once Al-Ahli were on the verge of surpassing Al-Ain’s first line of defence, The Boss would immediately drop back into a high pressing 4-1-4-1 before having a central midfielder – normally Lee MJ – slide back into the defensive midfield stratum along with Helal S and form a shield in front of the central defenders therefore nullifying any sort of Al-Ahli attacks from the centre. What Al-Ain failed to take note of although…

Al-Ahli stagnant in possession, but capitalise on high line

What the Red Knights excelled at was profiting from the suicidal high line implemented by Dalic’s men in the opening 45 minutes, and had it not been Ahmad Khalil being relied upon taking the reins up top, the score would have been different early on.

A common feature from Middle Eastern full-backs is their propensity to push forward whenever they are able to get a sniff of the ball or their opposing winger and it was no different today, with each pair of full backs acting aggressively towards their opposing flanks. This also affected the full-backs defensively with Mohammad Fayez being a key culprit in this situation. Once Al-Ahli became more direct and started to shift their focus onto the channels, Al-Ain were affected heavily as Fayez pushed up needlessly once the ball had arrived and this gave away space for the Red Knights to play the ball in and through.

Another aspect that can be easily manipulated in the Middle East is the lack of preservation of the inside channels, something Al-Ahli surprisingly secured very well today. This performance was a pivotal factor in depicting the adaptability and expertise of Olaroiu, who shifted his focus from a high line and attacking based approach to a more careful, but not conservative approach.

That was not the only time Fayez was caught out marking somewhere completely out of his zone, but another occasion where this happened kept Khalil onside and had it not been for Khaled Eisa’s (foolish) intervention by running out of his goal, the game would have probably been tilted into Al-Ahli’s favour.

Not your usual Cosmin Olaroiu performance: robust, tenacious yet wary – but it pays off in the end

Al-Ahli were extremely wary of the carnage that Al-Ain could have inflicted on them had they started off playing with an extremely high line as usual, therefore we can associate this with the fact that it was not your usual Cosmin Olaroiu performance of attacking and free-flowing football. There were occasions where Al-Ain would leave only one man on the halfway line during an attacking corner and left acres of space in the centre – something they assumed that Al-Ahli would have not capitalized on.

ELEVEN players are in the box for a corner.

And that was true, Al-Ahli wanted extra security during corners that they didn’t even place Ahmad Khalil or Ismaeel Al-Hammadi in that space to exploit Al-Ain during defensive to offensive transitions. Realistically, Al-Ahli could have exploited these very easily but Cosmin knew the consequences of conceding first to a team managed by Zlatko Dalic. If Al-Ahli went down 1-0 it would have been extremely hard for them to take advantage of The Boss in the upcoming stages of the game.

There is no Al-Ahli attacker near the ball to provide a counter attacking option.

This paid off in the end for Al-Ahli as the lone goal and the winning goal of the game came from their pressing – their superbly calculated and organised pressing. Al-Ahli never had more than 2 men hounding the opposing man on the ball and here they dispossessed Amoory while also keeping a solid midfield base behind them and a man in the box to take advantage of any crosses.

Salmeen Khamis, the centre back, showed intelligent movements by straying into the channels just off the near post and with no one marking him he slipped in a header to win the game for the Red Knights, adding another trophy to the glowing Middle Eastern cabinet of the astute Romanian, Cosmin Olaroiu.

Final Word: Refereeing decisions may have affected the game at the end but this is purely analysing the game from a tactical point of view, not a refereeing point of view. Al-Ahli were circumspect, with that being the key factor that propelled them to a win.

Al-Ahli 4-3 Al-Nassr (H)

Al-Ahli || Omar Al-Somah ‘41 (pen.), ‘67 (pen.), ‘78 | Osama Hawsawi ‘49

Al-Nassr || Mohammad Al-Sahlawi ‘12, ‘28, ‘82

Al-Nassr shape

Al-Nassr in a 4-2-3-1, Hussain Abdul-Ghani (LB) moving up in line with the double pivot.

Al-Nassr shaped up in an orthodox 4-2-3-1 that saw Aziz and Khamis pair up as a double pivot, tasked with protecting the defence – as you can see they sit very close to the centre backs. This double pivot came with its merits and its detriments – with one of the latter being a similar situation to the weaknesses found in Chelsea’s famed double pivot of Nemanja Matic and Cesc Fabregas. The front four interchanged throughout the match with no designated #10, mainly Adrian and Al-Fraidi switching positions throughout the game.

Al-Ahli shape

“Welly” supporting the 4 in midfield by anchoring behind them. Omar Al-Somah up top.

Al-Ahli continuously changed between their shape and structure from a 4-1-4-1 (as shown above), a 4-2-3-1, a 4-4-2 and a 4-5-1. Mostly, they stuck to the shape in the photo above. This provided support in the centre with Al-Moqahwi actually providing a threat from deep rather than playing on the flanks. Omar Al-Somah stayed in his role as the lone striker and Waleed “Welly” Bakhshween was the sole anchor – providing the water carrying among the team. Taiseer Al-Jassem was in more of a free role in today’s game as he used his experience, influence and energy to affect the proceedings of the game in attack.

Al-Nassr backed by fans and full backs

Al-Nassr were always going to have the atmospheric advantage as their fans came in large numbers – not large enough to fill more than half of the stadium – to support them with their fantastic Arabic songs. If you missed the game against Persepolis just last week in the Asian Champions League, then you missed out on one of the best fanbase performances in World Football, never mind the Middle East.

Moving on to the tactical side of the game, Al-Nassr’s full backs were superb in using their technical ability and speed to create and penetrate. Hussain Abdul-Ghani – current Al-Nassr left back who said “If any of my teammates from Al-Nassr scores on Al-Ahli I will still not celebrate. This is my boyhood club, and I would be happy to see them win the league; just not at our expense” – put in a performance that had big-game mentality all over it. He was more involved in the build-up play for Al-Nassr and this helped him towards attempting the second most passes in the team with 49. Creating 3 chances along the way too, Abdul-Ghani exuded confidence and was tactically intelligent, behaving accordingly towards the movements of the attacking players.

Shaya Shrahili, on the other hand, used his pace to attack the Al-Ahli defence

The ball through the channel reaches the oncoming Shrahili but the chance goes begging. This was a common feature that was successfully taken advantage of by the home team, which links with the next tactical factor that affected the game:

Flank-orientated play

Al-Nassr and Al-Ahli both utilised their flanks to great benefit. Previously mentioning how Al-Nassr used their full backs to take control of the wide channels, we now look at how they exploited that to score a goal.

“Welly” blocking halfspace and channel very well, but to no avail. Long ball in red dots.

Fabian had two, very threatening options in this situation. To his right, Shaya overlapping again – drawing out the opposition left back – causing a breach in the defensive line of Al-Ahli. “Welly” actually positioned himself well to prevent the through ball into the isolated channel for Al-Fraidi to take advantage of. Fabian used the second option, a long diagonal to the oncoming winger (his back foot seen just to the left of #77 on the bottom left of the photo), who actually was offside – but that didn’t matter as the referee counted the goal – and the attention of the Al-Ahli right back turned to Adrian.

Adrian slipped a ball inside without hesitation, similar to how Benzema did to Ronaldo in this week’s Clasico, and the never-say-die attitude of Mohammad Al-Sahlawi paid off as he tapped the ball in just as it was about to move away from the face of goal:

Set-piece and aerial defending causes destruction for both teams

The set-piece defending in this game was downright poor and the detrimental effects were clear on both teams as both of the teams conceded a minimum of two goals from a set piece or aerial ball. The first goal from Al-Nassr began from their consistent use of flanks in their build-up. They subsequently won a corner and a short pass was played in, drawing a defender out and deceiving the rest of the Al-Ahli defence who stuck to their zonal marking strategy.

EXAMPLE ONE:

If you look at the penalty spot, you can see Mohammad Al-Sahlawi (#10) and Hussain (#2) deeper, unmarked and free in space.

Taiseer Al-Jassim is seen running towards the then-ball carrier leaving 6 Al-Ahli players marking the edge of the 6-yard box with no idea of what to do – Al-Nassr were doing something abnormal according to their reactions. And then came in the cross, out of nowhere jumped the aerially powerful Mohammad Al-Sahlawi to make a bursting stride towards the loose ball in the air to powerfully head the ball in, hitting the bar and bouncing back down. No goal line technology here in the Middle East but the referee claimed it was a goal. 1-0 to Al-Nassr.

One of zonal marking’s key aspects to accomplish success is the awareness of late runners which can be done through a mix of man and zonal marking. Clearly, Al-Ahli failed to do that with all of their players ball watching rather than adjusting their stance according to the player in their zone.

EXAMPLE TWO:

Osama Hawsawi was tracked poorly in this situation and he was a microsecond away from heading the ball in had he made an earlier jump. Followed closely by no one, Hawsawi unluckily nodded the ball over him as his follow through was late.

The reason for that is the 2v3 underload around the penalty spot with Al-Ahli’s attackers against Al-Nassr’s defenders. Once again, the lack of cohesion in the defensive phase for Al-Nassr was evident in situations akin to this. Realise that Hawsawi is being watched from behind him, with that Al-Nassr player leaving his man free to deal with the freedom of Hawsawi. Diabolical piece of defending, but nothing out of sorts taking it into context – we are in the Middle East.

EXAMPLE THREE:

This time the former Anderlecht defender Osama Hawsawi connected impeccably with the cross and scored on Al-Nassr for the equalising goal. The sharing of duties across the Al-Nassr defence, again, was dreadful. Just before the whistle blew for the kick to be played a couple of Al-Nassr defenders took a step forward and back again, uncoordinatedly, and left themselves on the back foot trying to form an offside trap. That’s why Osama scored so easily, while being onside and free in space:

http://prosports.mbc.net/lvp/player_cuepoints.html?id=0

What happens now?

Well with Al-Ahli’s double over league leaders Al-Nassr the Abdul Latif Jameel Pro League is currently on fire. Well, the top four is. Don’t be surprised to see Al-Nassr, Al-Ahli, Al-Ittihad and Al-Hilal taking up the Champions League spots come the end of the season but the separation total in points from 1st to 4th is 7 points – only. With key fixtures in the last four weeks of the season starting off with Al-Hilal vs. Al-Ittihad, before going into the last two weeks of the season where Al-Hilal welcome Al-Nassr and Al-Ahli face Al-Ittihad.

Final Word: Omar Al-Somah has scored 21 goals in 20 games for Al-Ahli this season, proving himself as a modern-day striker that can fit into the depths of this game. Technically able, physical and commanding, Al-Somah will hope that a trial from Europe comes in once again.